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Abstract
I summarize and extend my results establishing that limited arbitrage is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and for the compactness
of the Pareto frontier [11] (announced in [14] and [8]). In response to a comment [36],
I show that the authors misunderstood my results by focussing on brief announce-
ments [14] and [8] which did not detail the hypothesis, rather than on the publication
which contains the proofs [11]. The original results are extended here to encompass
"mixed economies" based on [16]. They are used to define a topological invariant
for a competitive market, which encodes exact information on its equilibria and on
its social diversity, and predicts a failure of 'effective' demand.
1 Introduction
Limited arbitrage is a unifying concept for resource allocation. It is defined from the
traders' endowments and preferences, and is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for
the existence of a competitive equilibrium,1 for the nonemptiness of the core2 and for the
existence of satisfactory social choice rules.3 This paper responds to a recent comment
on my work on market equilibrium [36]. The three authors misunderstood my results by
focussing on brief announcements in papers which cover other areas, algebraic topology
[8] and social choice [14], rather than on the publication which contains the proofs on
equilibrium [11]. I correct the comment's errors and show that the example in the comment
is a "mixed economy", while none of my three publications which the comment addresses—
[11], [8] and [14]—cover mixed economies. In Sections 2 to 6 below I review my results
for mixed economies following [16]—cited in the comment as Chichilnisky (1995b)—and
show that the comment's example is consistent with my results in [16].
The comment calls attention to my results on the classic Arrow Debreu market without
short sales [11] and [16]. I report on these in Sections 2 to 6. I correct the comment's
misunderstandings and errors and show that limited arbitrage is indeed necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium, with or without short sales, and
whether the economy is mixed or not.
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The paper is organized as follows. The first part addresses mixed economies following
[16], and situates limited arbitrage within the context of a new wider concept, a topo-
logical invariant for competitive markets. This topological invariant, denoted CH,
encodes exact information about the existence of an equilibrium for the economy and its
subeconomies, measures social diversity [14] and predicts a failure of 'effective' demand
in a sense similar to that of Arrow and Hahn [1] .4 A special case is when the invariant
is zero: then the market has limited arbitrage. The second part of the paper uses the
material in the first part to provide a response to the comment [36].
Sections 2 to 4 summarize my original results on the equivalence of limited arbitrage,
the compactness of the Pareto frontier and the existence of an equilibrium given in [10],
[11], [12] extending them on the basis of [16] to encompass mixed economies, which are
the subject of the comment. Sections 5 and 6 cover social diversity and the failure of
effective demand, and Section 7 introduces the topological invariant CH. Sections 8 and
9 use the earlier material to provide a detailed response to the comment.
How does limited arbitrage work? Limited arbitrage is strictly weaker than other
conditions used to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, which is why it can be necessary
and well as sufficient. Other conditions bound the feasible and individually rational trades.
Limited arbitrage only bounds the utility levels which are achieved by such trades. The
crucial insight is the equivalence of limited arbitrage and the compactness of the Pareto
frontier in utility space.5 The Pareto frontier is a central concept for resource allocation,
and I showed that it controls the existence of an equilibrium, of the core and of satisfactory
social choice rules. Limited arbitrage is the non-empty intersection of all market cones.
The topological invariant CH is a wider concept: it predicts which cones intersect and
which do not. It is based on cohomology and builds on my necessary and sufficient
condition for the non-empty intersection of sets of [8].
2 Definitions
This section addresses "mixed economies" which is the subject of the comment, on the
basis of [16]. This is a class of economies where different traders have different types of
preferences, and is larger than the class of economies covered in [11]. The definitions and
results provided here are correspondingly more general than those of [II].6 However, I
show that the definitions and the results given here are identical to those in [11] when
restricted to the smaller domain of "homogenous" economies covered by [11]. This sets up
a clear framework for discussing the case of mixed economies and the example provided
in the comment, in Sections 8 and 9.
An Arrow Debreu market E = {X, Qh,uh, h = 1,..., H} has H > 2 traders, all with the
same trading space X, 7 X = R+ orX = RN, N > 2. The results presented here also hold
4See p. 345 of [1].
5The Pareto frontier is the set of undominated and individually rational utility values. This equivalence
was established in [18], [22], [10], [12], [11], [16].
6The results on limited arbitrage, the Pareto frontier and equilibrium in [11] hold in "homogeneous"
economies where either all indifferences have half lines or none do, and where either all traders have
indifference surfaces bounded below, or none do, see p. 103, Section 7.0.1, lines 1-5; mixed cases were
covered in [16]. These results originated from a theorem in Chichilnisky and Heal [18], a paper which was
submitted for publication in February 1984 and was published in February 1993 [22]. Chichilnisky and
Heal [22] introduced a non-arbitrage condition C which is identical to limited arbitrage for preferences
without half lines, and proved that it is sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier (Lemmas 4
and 5) and for the existence of an equilibrium (Theorem 1) with or without half lines, with or without
short sales, and in finite or infinite dimensions. [11] and Section 4 below discuss the literature further.
7R^ = {(*! , . . . ,XJV)€ RN :Vi,Xi >0} .
in infinite dimensions [21]. Traders may have zero endowments of some goods. Qh € R+
denotes trader Ws property rights. When X = R%, Slh ^ 0 V/i and £ h fi/i = fi » 0.
Assumption 0. Trader h has a preference represented by a continuous,
quasiconcave and increasing function Uh : X —• R.8
The assumptions and the results in this paper are ordinal;9 therefore without loss of
generality assume that for all h, Uh(0) = 0 and sup{ I :xeX}. Uh(x) = oo.
Assumption 1. When X = R%, Vr > 0 any boundary ray T is transversal to
Remark 1 Assumption 1 means that either a boundary ray T does not intersect u^ (r)
or, if it does, the utility Uh does not achieve a maximum on T.11
Definition 1 A preference on RN is uniformly non-satiated if it has a utility represen-
tation satisfying 3 K,e > 0 such that K || x — y \\>\ u(y)—u(x) \> e \\ x — y ||,Vx,y G RN.
Intuitively, a preference is uniformly non satiated when its rate of increase is uniformly
bounded.
The following Assumption 2 restricts the rate of increase of the representing utility,
and allows indifferences with or without "fiats". Geometrically, this assumption includes
two types of preferences: in case (a) every indifference surface contains half lines in every
direction, and in case (b) -no indifference surface contains half lines in any direction.
Formally:
Assumption 2. When X = RN, preferences are uniformly non-satiated, and
they satisfy one of the following two mutually exclusive conditions: (a)
the normalized gradient to any closed set of indifferent vectors define a
closed set12 or (b) no indifference surface contains half lines.
Remark 2 There is one situation when the case X = RN is formally identical to the case
where X = R+ and where all traders have interior endowments: this is when X = RN
and all traders' indifference surfaces are bounded below.13 In this case short trades are
allowed but no trader will trade below the utility level of the initial endowment so short
8This means that u(x) > u(y) if x > y, and u(x) > u(y) if x >> y. Preferences need not be strictly
increasing coordinatewise. If x, y € RN, x > y •tt-Vixi>t/i,a;>j/<=>a;>y and for some i, Xi > yi, and
x >> y <=> Vi, Xi > yi.
9Namely independent of the utility representations.
A boundary ray is an open half line starting from 0 contained in dR^. Here we say that a manifold
X C R is transversal to another Y at a point x if either X and Y do not intersect, or when they do,
neither of their respective tangent fields at x, TX (x)and TY(x), are contained in the other. Under this
assumption, when the indifferences of u^ intersect dR1^ then the function admits a smooth representation
on a neighborhood of R^.
1 1
 Assumption 1 includes strictly convex preferences, preferences with indifferences of positive utility
which do not intersect the boundary of the positive orthant such as Cobb Douglas and CES preferences,
Leontief preferences u(x, y) = min(aa;, by), preferences which are indifferent to one or more commodities,
such as u(x,y,z) = y/x + y, preferences with indifference surfaces which contain rays of dR+ such as
u(x, y, z) = x, and preferences defined on a neighborhood of the positive orthant or the whole space, and
which are increasing along the boundaries, e.g. u(x, y,z) = x + y -f z.
12I.e. the map x —> D%( i ) / || Dv,h(x \\ maps closed sets of an indifference surface into closed sets in
the unit sphere. This means that the gradient directions to any indifference surface define a closed set,
and corresponds to case (a) in [11], encompassing here preferences whose indifferences are bounded below
or not. See Sections 8 and 9 for details.
13A set 5 is said to be bounded below when 3y 6 RN : Vx € S, x > y.
trades are bounded below. It is worth observing that uniform non-satiation ensures that if
one trader has one indifference surface bounded below, then all this trader's indifference
surfaces are bounded below.
Definition 2 A mixed economy is one which has more than one type of preferences:
some traders have preferences of type (a) and others of type (b), and/or some traders have
indifferences bounded below, and others not.
Remark 3 Sections 2-7 of this paper and [16] cover mixed economies; in [11] either all
traders had indifferences bounded below or none did, and either all traders were of type (a),
or all traders were of type (6), see [11] p. 103, Section 7.0.1., lines 1-5. The definitions
and results are however identical to those in [11] for the cases which that paper covered.
Remark 4 It can be shown that if u is concave and non-satiated, then on any two di-
mensional subspace S C RN 3e > 0 :| u(y) — u(x) \> £ \\ x — y ||, Vx,y £ S, see [17].
2.1 Global and Market Cones
Two cases, X = RN and X = R+ , are considered separately.
• Consider first X = RN.
Definition 3 For trader h define the cone of directions Ah(Qh) along which utility in-
creases without bound:
Ah(nh) = {x £ X : \/y £ X,3X > 0 : uh{Qh + Arc) > uh(y)}
The rays of this cone intersect all indifference surfaces preferred to Qh- In case (a) the
cone Ah(fth) is open (Proposition 1 of [11]). When augmented by the part of its boundary
along which utility never ceases to increase Ak(^h) defines the global cone Gk(Qh)—both
cones are new in the literature:14
Gh(flh) = {x £ X and ~ 3argmaxw / l(f]/ l +A^)} (1)
>0
Gh(^h) treats all convex preferences in a unified way and under Assumption 2 it has a
simple structure shown in Proposition 3 of the Appendix: in case (a) when preferences have
half lines G^i^h) it equals Ah(fih), and it equals its closure when indifferences contain no
half lines, case (b); Gh(Qh) is independent of the initial endowment Qh-15 Therefore this
cone is identical to the global cone G^ used in [11] to define limited arbitrage, see [11], p.
85, (4).
The cone A^i^h) h a s points in common with Debreu's [23] "asymptotic cone" corresponding to the
preferred set of u^ at the initial endowment Q,^, in that along any of the rays of Ah(Qh) utility increases.
Under Assumption 1, its closure A(Qh), equals the "recession" cone used by Rockafeller in the 1960's,
but not generally: when preferences have "fans" as defined in [16], then the recession cone differs from
Ah,(tth)i see [16]. Along the rays in Ah,(Qh.) not only does utility increase forever, but it increases beyond
the utility level of any other vector in the space. This condition need not be satisfied by asymptotic cones
or by recession cones. For example, for Leontief preferences the recession cone through the endowment
is the closure of the upper contour, which includes the indifference curve itself. By contrast, the cone
Ah(rih) ls the interior of the upper contour set. Related concepts appeared in Chichilnisky [4], [6], [11]
[7] and [13]; otherwise there is no precedent in the literature for global cones Ah(^h) o r ^h(^h)-
15The cone G/l(f2/l) is therefore called "uniform" and denoted also G^.
The market cone of trader h is
Dh(Qh) = {zeX:Vy£ Gh{tth), (z,y) > 0.} (2)
is the convex cone of prices assigning strictly positive value to all directions in G/l(Q/l).
• Consider next the case: X = R+.
The market cone of trader h is:
Dt(Qh) = Dh{nh)C\S{E) if S{E) C N, ( 3 )
otherwise,
where S{E) is the set of supports to rational affordable efficient allocations:16
S(E) = {v e RN : if {xv..xH) G T, (v,xh - Qh) = 0,
and uh{zh) > uh{xh) then (v,zh- xh) > 0 V^}, (4)
and where N is the set of prices orthogonal to the endowments.17
N = {v G R+ - {0} : 3/i with (v, tth) = 0}. (5)
The market cones D^{Qh) typically vary with the initial endowments. When V7i




When global cones are independent of the initial endowments, this condition is sat-
isfied simultaneously at every set of endowments. In case (b) {LA) is identical to the
no-arbitrage condition C introduced in [18], p. 374, and used there to prove the com-
pactness of the Pareto frontier and the existence of an equilibrium with short sales. This
definition of limited arbitrage is also identical to that in [11], p. 89, Section 3.1 in the
cases which that paper covers.
16The expression "(v, x^ — J7 )^ — 0" was missing in the definition of S(E) in [11] due to a typographical
error, which was corrected in the revised version of [16].
177V is empty when V/i, flh » 0.
1SR^+ is the interior of R^. The market cone D^ contains R+t when S(E) has a vector assigning
strictly positive income to all individuals. If some trader has zero income, then this trader must have a
boundary endowment.
U i
Figure 1: limited arbitrage is satisfied. The two
global conea lie In the halfspace defimed by P. There
are no feasible trades that Increase utilities without
limit: these would consist of pain of points
symmetrically placed about the common initial
endowment, and such pairs of points lead to utility
values below those of the endowments at a
bounded distance from the initial endowments.
U i
Figure 2: Limited arbitrage does not hold. The
global cones are not contained in n half space,
and there are sequences of feasible allocations
such as (W1,W1<), (W2.W21) which produce
unbounded utilities.
Definition 5 / / X = R+, E satisfies limited arbitrage when
(LA (6)
This definition is identical to that in [11], (8), p. 91, Section 3.3.
The set of feasible indiv idual ly rat ional t rades is T = {(XI,...,XH) € XH :
Wh,Uh{xh) > Uh(Qh), a n d ]C/i=i xh — ^ ) - Th e se^ °f feasible individually rational utility
allocations is
U(E) = {U={U1,...,UH) : Uh = uh(xh) > uh(Qh) where (x1,...,xH) € T} .
The Pareto frontier P(E) is the set of undominated vectors in U(E):
P(E) = {U e U{E) :~ 3V G C7(E) with V > U}.
A competitive equilibrium is a price vector p* £ R+ and an allocation (x\...x*H) £
T such that Yl%=i x*h ~ ^ h ~ 0 anc* xh maximizes uh over the budget set Bh(p*) = {x £
X:(x-Qh,p*)=0}.
2.2 A Financial Interpretation of Limited Arbitrage
It is useful to show the connection between limited arbitrage and the notion of "no-
arbitrage" used in finance. The concepts are generally different, but in certain cases they
coincide. In financial markets an arbitrage opportunity exists when gains can be made at
no cost, or, equivalently, by taking no risks. The simplest illustration of the link between
limited arbitrage and no-arbitrage is an economy E where the traders' initial endowments
are zero, Qh — 0, and the normalized gradient of a closed set of indifference vectors define
a closed set, case (a). Here no-arbitrage at the initial endowments means that there
are no trades which could increase the traders' utilities at zero cost: gains from trade
must be zero. By contrast, limited arbitrage means that no trader can increase utility
beyond a given bound at zero cost; as seen below in 3.1, gains from trade are bounded.
In brief: in this example no-arbitrage requires that there should be no gains from trade
at zero cost while limited arbitrage requires that there should be only bounded or limited
gains from trade at zero cost.
In case (b) limited arbitrage has a stricter meaning: it implies that traders will not
engage in unboundedly large transactions; this is identical to the no-arbitrage condition
C introduced in [18], p. 374.
When the traders' utilities are linear functions, the two concepts coincide: there is
limited arbitrage if and only if there is no-arbitrage as defined in finance. In brief: in
linear economies, limited arbitrage "collapses" into no-arbitrage.
3 Limited Arbitrage and the Compactness of the Pareto
Frontier
The Pareto frontier P(E) is the set of feasible, individually rational and undominated
utility allocations. The compactness (and nonemptiness) of the Pareto frontier is a crucial
step in establishing the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
It is useful to clarify the difference between limited arbitrage and conditions used
elsewhere.19 Other conditions used in the literature require a compact set of feasible indi-
vidually rational allocations T.20 For example, the no-arbitrage condition C of [22] ensures
Case (b), when indifferences contain no half lines, is particularly simple: under limited arbitrage
feasible and rational trades always define a compact set, exactly as in economies without short sales.
20Without short sales the set T is always compact. In economies with short sales, Chichilnisky and
Heal [18], [22] introduced the "no-arbitrage condition C", and similar conditions were used in Werner
[41], Nielsen [38], Koutsougeras [35] (and several others), the latter three based on recession cones.
Any no-arbitrage condition based on recession cones amounts to a compact set of feasible and desirable
allocations T in commodity space, see e.g. Lemma 2 of Chichilnisky [11] and Lemma 10.1, Section 10,
p. 20 of Koutsougeras [35]. Werner's sufficient condition for existence is somewhat weaker because he
removes some constant directions from the recession cone, but like all the others it is strictly stronger than
limited arbitrage. He requires 5 = nSi ^ 0, (see Theorem 1 on p. 1410 of [41]) where Si = {p : (p, x) > 0
for all x G Wi} (bottom of p. 1409), and where Wi is the recession cones minus the directions along which
a compact set of individually rational and feasible trades T, and thus the compactness of
P(E).21 By contrast, limited arbitrage ensures a compact utility possibility set, without
requiring the compactness of the underlying set of trades T see [7], [10], [11], [12], [14],
[13], [16], and [20]. It has been established within homogeneous economies that limited
arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for a compact utility possibility set U(E), and hence
the compactness of its boundary P(E),22 for details see [10], [11], [19], [22]. The following
Theorem extends this result to mixed economies following [16].
Theorem 1 Consider an economy E as defined in Section 1. Then limited arbitrage is
necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the set of feasible and individually rational
utility allocations U(E), and therefore for the compactness and non-emptiness of the Pareto
frontier P(E). Feasible allocations and undominated utility allocations may however define
unbounded sets.
Proof. See the Appendix. B
Proposition 1 When X = RN, limited arbitrage implies that the Pareto frontier P(E)<Z
R+ is homeomorphic to a simplex.23
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and the convexity of preferences, cf. Arrow and
Hahn [1]. •
3.1 Interpretation of Limited Arbitrage as Bounded Gains From
Trade when X = RN
Limited arbitrage has a simple interpretation in terms of gains from trade when X = RN.
Gains from trade are defined as follows:
H
G(E) = sup
T was defined above as the set of feasible and individually rational allocations.
Proposition 2 The economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only it has bounded gains
from trade which are attainable, i.e. 3x* £ T :
H
G(E) = Y^uh{x*h) ~ uh{Vth) < oo.
the utility is constant, see 1408, p. 6, last two lines. Observe that Wi contains many directions which
are not included in G^ such as those directions along which the preference is eventually constant without
being constant. Such directions are not part of the global cone G^ defined here and in [11]. Therefore
the cone Wi is strictly larger than the global cone G^ , and the condition S ^ 0 is strictly stronger than
limited arbitrage as defined here and in [11]. Werner's condition is therefore not necessary for existence
of an equilibrium unless indifferences contain no half lines, see also Proposition 2, (ii), p. 1410 of [41]. In
this latter case, Werner's condition bounds the set of all feasible individually rational allocations T as do
all other non-arbitrage conditions except for limited arbitrage.
21Lemmas 4 and 5 of [18] prove the compactness of P(E) using its "no-arbitrage condition C" which is
identical to limited arbitrage when indifferences have no half lines, see [18] p. 374, [11] and [16].
22Lemma 2 of [11] established that limited arbitrage is sufficient for compactness of P(E) and Theorem
1 of [11], by the second welfare theorem, proved that limited arbitrage is necessary for compactness of
P(E), because it is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium.
23A topological space X is homeomorphic to another Y when there exists a on-to-one onto map / :
X —> Y which is continuous and has a continuous inverse.
Proof. Proposition 3 in the Appendix shows that under the conditions global cones are
independent of the initial endowments, so we may assume without loss of generality that
Qh = 0 for all h. Sufficiency first. The sum J2h=i Uh defines a continuous function of
(UI,...,UH) € -R+; this continuous function always attains a maximum when the vector
iii,...,W/,, varies over the set U(E) C R+, which is compact by Theorem 1 when limited
arbitrage is satisfied. The converse is immediate from the proof of necessity in Theo-
rem 1, which establishes that when limited arbitrage fails, there exist no undominated
individually rational utility allocations, i.e. P(E) is empty. I
Corollary 1 In case (a) the economy has limited arbitrage if and only if it has bounded
gains from trade, i.e.24
G(E) < oo.
Proof. Recall that in case (a), Gh = Ah by Proposition 3 in the Appendix. In this case
limited arbitrage is also necessary for bounded gains from trade. H
4 Competitive Equilibrium and Limited Arbitrage
It was proved in [11] that limited arbitrage is simultaneously necessary and sufficient
for existence of a competitive equilibrium in economies with or without short sales.25
This result was established in [11] for economies where preferences were homogeneous:
either all preferences are of type (a) or all of type (b), and either all have indifferences
bounded below or none do. Below I show that this is true for mixed economies, where
some preferences may be of type (a) and others of type (b), where some indifferences
are bounded below and others are not. This follows [16]. This result includes the classic
economy of Arrow and Debreu without short sales, which was neglected previously in the
literature on no-arbitrage. The equivalence between limited arbitrage and equilibrium
extends to economies with infinitely many markets, see [21].
Recall that limited arbitrage implies a compact set of feasible and individually ratio-
nal utility allocations U(E), without requiring that the underlying trades T be compact.
Therefore under limited arbitrage the set of equilibria, the set of undominated utility
allocations and the core may all be unbounded when X = RN.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy E = {X, w^, Q/,,,/?. = 1,...,H}, where H > 2, with
X — RN or X — R^_ and N > 1 . Then the following two properties are equivalent:
In the following equation "oo" must be replaced by sup.^.^g^-^ (X h^.—1 uh(x) ~ u / i ( ^h ) ) w n e D ^ ^
sxvpX£Xuh(x) < oo.
25Chichilnisky and Heal [18], Hart [28] Hammond [27] and Werner [41] among others, have defined var-
ious no-arbitrage conditions which they prove, under certain conditions on preferences, to be sufficient for
existence of equilibrium. Hart and Hammond study asset market models which are incomplete economies
because they lack forward markets, and therefore have typically inefficient equilibria. None of these no-
arbitrage conditions is generally necessary for existence. For the special case (b), within economies with
short sales (which exclude the classic Arrow Debreu's market), and where recession cones are assumed
to be uniform, Werner [41] remarks correctly (p. 1410, last para.) that another related condition (p.
1410, line -3) is necessary for existence, without however providing a complete proof of the equivalence
between the condition which is necessary and that which is sufficient. The two conditions in [41] are
defined on different sets of cones: the sufficient condition is defined on cones Si (p. 1410, line -14) while
the necessary condition is defined on other cones, Di (p. 1410, -3). The equivalence between the two
cones depends on properties of yet another family of cones Wi (see p. 1410, lines 13-4). The definition of
Wi on page 1408, line -15 shows that Wi is different from the recession cone Ri, (which are uniform by
assumption) and therefore the cone Wi need not be uniform even when the recession cones are, as needed
in Werner's Proposition 2.
(i) The economy E has limited arbitrage
(ii) The economy E has a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix. •
Remark 5 When X — RN the set of competitive equilibria need not be bounded.
4.1 Subeconomies with Competitive Equilibria
As shown in [11] the condition of limited arbitrage need not be tested on all traders
simultaneously: in the case of RN, it needs only be satisfied on subeconomies with no
more traders than the number of commodities in the economy, N, plus one.
Definition 6 A k—trader sub-economy ofE is an economy F consisting of a subset of k <
H traders in E, each with the endowments and preferences as in E: F = {X,Uh, Clh, h £
J C { 1 , -., H}, cardinality (J) = k < H}.
Theorem 3 The following four properties of an economy E with trading space RN are
equivalent:
(i) E has a competitive equilibrium
(ii) Every sub economy of E with at most N + 1 traders has a competitive equilibrium
(Hi) E has limited arbitrage
(iv) E has limited arbitrage for any subset of traders with no more that TV-1-1 members.
Proof. Theorem 2 implies (i)<^(iii) and (ii)<£>(iv). That (iii)«=>(iv) follows from Helly's
theorem, which is a corollary in Chichilnisky [8]: Consider a family {£/i}i=i...// of convex
sets in RN, H,N> 1. Then
H
t = i
0 if and only if f] U{ / 0
for any subset of indices J C {1...//} having at most N + 1 elements.
In particular, an economy E satisfies limited arbitrage, if and only if it satisfies limited
arbitrage for any subset of k — N + 1 traders, where N is the number of commodities in
the economy E. I
5 A failure of 'effective' demand when X — R+.
In economies without short sales X = R+ a compensated equilibrium or quasiequi-
librium always exists, Arrow and Hahn [1] and Negishi [37]. However, when limited
arbitrage fails, quasiequilibria are ill-behaved; I show below that every quasiequilibrium
has a failure of 'effective' demand, in the sense of Arrow and Hahn [1], p. 345.
Definition 7 A compensated equilibrium or quasiequilibrium is a price p* and an alloca-
tion x* at which every trader minimizes the cost of achieving the given utility level, and
10
rr
Although a quasiequilibrium allocation x* satisfies Ylh-i(x*h ~ ^^) ~ >^ x* c a n ex~
hibit 'excess demand', if demand is computed from utility maximization under a budget
constraint. This is because at the quasiequilibrium allocation traders minimize costs,
but may not maximize utility. If at a quasiequilibrium allocation every trader maximizes
utility, then the quasiequilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 8 An allocation and a price exhibit a failure of effective demand in the sense of
flj when in some markets there exists excess demand (computed from utility maximization
subject to a budget constraint), but the value of this excess demand is zero.
Theorem 4 When X = R+ a failure of limited arbitrage implies that there is a failure
of effective demand: every quasiequilibrium has excess demand, but the market value of
this demand is zero.
Proof. A quasi equilibrium price p* — (pl,...,p*N) 6 R+ always exists because X —
R+ . As seen in Theorem 2 if limited arbitrage fails there is no competitive equilibrium.
This implies that at any quasiequilibrium some trader has zero income (for otherwise a
quasiequilibrium is always a competitive equilibrium). Therefore for at least one market
2, p* = 0, and the value of excess demand in the i — th market is therefore zero. For
some trader h, p* £ D£ (since otherwise the quasiequilibrium would be a competitive
equilibrium) so that there is no maximum for Uh on the budget set defined by p*. Therefore
there is excess demand at p* in the i — th market, but the value of excess demand in this
market is zero. B
6 Social Diversity and Limited Arbitrage
If the economy does not have limited arbitrage, it is called socially diverse:
Definition 9 When X = RN, the economy is socially diverse if f]h=1 Dh = 0
This concept is independent of the units of measurement or choice of numeraire.
Social diversity admits as many different "shades" as traders:
Definition 10 The economy E has index of diversity /(E) = H — K if K + 1 is the
smallest number such that 3J C {I...H} with cardinality of J = K +1 , and f]hGj Dh = 0-
The index /(E) ranges between 0 and H — 1 : the larger the index, the larger the social
diversity. The index is smallest (= 0) when all the market cones intersect: then all social
diversity disappears, and the economy has limited arbitrage.
Theorem 5 The index of social diversity is I(E) if and only if H — I(E) is the maximum
number of traders for which every subeconomy has a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. This is immediate from Theorem 3. I
7 A topological invariant for competitive markets
This section introduces a new and useful concept, a topological invariant for com-
petitive markets. This is an algebraic object which describes important properties
of the market—its social diversity and the existence of an equilibrium for it or for its
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subeconomies—in a way that is robust, namely independent of the units of measure-
ment. The topological invariant CH introduced here contains exact information about
the resource allocation properties of the economy, as shown below. Furthermore it is
computable by simple algorithms from the initial data of the problem: its endowments
and preferences.
Important properties of an economy E with short sales can be described in terms of
the properties of a family of cohomology rings denoted CH(E). The cohomology rings26
of a space Y contain information about the topological structure of Y, namely those
properties of the space which remain invariant when the space is deformed as if it was
made of rubber. For formal definitions of the algebraic topology concepts used here a
standard textbook is Spanier [40].
The following concept, called a nerve, defines a combinatorial object, called a sim-
plicial complex, from any family of sets. Starting from any arbitrary family of sets in
RN, one defines from it a triangulated set, obtained by "pasting up" simplices in a well
ordered fashion, see [40], called a simplicial complex. The simplicial complex created
from the family of sets is usually called the "nerve of the family of sets". The procedure
for transforming any family of sets into a simplicial complex is as follows: each set is
represented by a point, which is a vertex in the triangulated space; the intersection of any
two sets in the family is represented as a one-simplex, the intersection of any three sets as
a 2-simplex, etc. It is simple to see that putting all this together one obtains a simplicial
complex [40]. Formally:
Definition 11 The nerve of a family of subsets {Vi}l=i^..,£, in RM, denoted
is a simplicial complex defined as follows: each subfamily ofk+\ sets in {Vi]l=\
non-empty intersection is a k — simplex of the
Now that the nerve of a family of sets is defined, one looks at the global topology
of this simplicial complex, in words, how many "holes" it has, and of what type. This
is measured by the cohomology rings of the space, which are groups with an additional
operation, which measure precisely the number and types of holes which the space has.
The cohomology rings are computable by standard algorithms once the market cones of
the economy are known. See Spanier for definitions [40]. Now we are ready to define our
topological invariant.
A subfamily of the family of sets {Dh)h=\,...,H is a family consisting of some of the
sets in {Dh}h=i,...,//, and is indicated {Dh}h&Q where Q C {1,...,//}. The topological
invariant CH(E) of the economy E with X = RN is the family of reduced cohomol-
ogy rings2' of the simplicial complexes defined by all subfamilies {-D/I}/K=Q of the family
{Dh}h=i,2...H, i-e. the cohomology rings of nerve{Dh}heQ for every Q C {1,...,H} :
CH(E) = {H*(nerve{Dh}h£QyQ C {1, . . . ,#}}
In the following result I consider continuous deformations of the economy which pre-
serve all the Assumptions in Section 2. Any such deformation will preserve our topological
26A ring is a set Q endowed with two operations, denoted + and X; the operation + must define a
group structure for Q (every element has an inverse under +) and the operation x defines a semi group
structure for Q; both operations together satisfy a distributive relation. A typical example of a ring is
the set of the integers, another the rational numbers, both with addition and multiplication.
2 7
 With integer coefficients.
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invariant. The following result shows how much information is encoded in CH(E). It shows
that the existence of an equilibrium for the economy and its subeconomies are purely topo-
logical properties, and they are predicted exactly by the number and the type of 'holes'
in the nerve of the family of market cones of the economy, i.e. by the cohomology rings
of this nerve. This result depends on a new theorem in Chichilnisky [8] which established
that a family of finitely many convex sets has non empty intersection if and only if each
subfamily has a contractible union:
Theorem 6 The economy E with H traders has limited arbitrage, and therefore a com-
petitive equilibrium if and only if:
CH(E) = 0
i.e.WQc { I , - , / / } , H*(nerve{Dh}heQ)=O
Furthermore, the economy E has social diversity index /(E) if and only if I(E) = H—K,
where K satisfies the following conditions: (i) for every set Q c {1. -••,-#} of cardinality
at most K
H*(nerve{Dh}h€Q)=0,
and there exists T C {l, ...,i/} with cardinality T = K + 1 and
H*(nerve{Dh}heT)^0.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 to Theorem 6, p. 200 of Chichilnisky
[8], which proves that an acyclic family of sets has non empty intersection if and only if
every subfamily has acyclic union,28 see [8] for details. B
8 Response and Examples
This section and Section 9 give more detailed responses to a comment [36] which focusses
on the announcements contained in my publications [8] and [14]; the comment also men-
tions my original results in [11]. Sections 8 and 9 are independent of the rest of the paper,
and can be skipped by the informed reader without loss.
This section discusses several examples and points out errors in the comment [36]
which, when corrected, invalidate its conclusions. Some of the errors appear repeated in
difference contexts within [36], requiring the response to address them, correspondingly,
more than once. In addition, example 3 below shows that limited arbitrage is strictly
weaker than resource relatedness [1].
The comment [36] consists of a simple example of a "mixed economy" with two traders.
One trader's indifferences are bounded below, and the second trader's are not; one trader
has indifferences with half lines and the other does not. This is a type of economy which
I never claimed to cover in my work which the comment addresses. The authors erred
by focussing on two papers which cover other areas, algebraic topology [8] and social
choice [14] ,29 rather than on the publication which contains the proofs on equilibrium
[11]. Theorem 1 of [11] does not explicitly mention whether mixed cases are covered, but
it is clear to anyone who reads my proofs in [11] that they were not intended to apply
28This result applies also to more general families.
29These two papers [14], [8] prove results in other areas—algebraic topology and social choice
respectively—and only mention equilibrium in brief announcements without details or proofs. For proofs
the reader was referred elsewhere [11].
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to the mixed case.30 In addition, the authors of the comment misread my definition of
global cones. They say that their example satisfies limited arbitrage, but it does not. This
error has already been pointed out in [29], and by itself invalidates the conclusions of the
comment.
The mixed case was covered in another paper [16], which the three authors cite in their
comment as Chichilnisky (1995b). [16] extends the definition of the global cone in [11] to
encompass mixed economies; both definitions are identical in the economies which both
papers cover. My results for mixed economies in [16] are consistent with the comment's
example, but the three authors fail to mention this fact. In sum: the comment contains
only special cases of my results. My Theorem 1 in [11] proves that limited arbitrage is
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in homogeneous
economies, a result which holds true exactly as stated and proved.31
The literature on no arbitrage had neglected the classical economy of Arrow and
Debreu without short sales. My results on this subject are highlighted in the comment.
It discuses two figures in [11] (4B and 7). The authors have misread my conditions and
my results and state, incorrectly, that these figures contradict my results. They do not,
and it is simple enough to correct the comment's error. As shown below, these figures are
simple illustrations for Theorem 1 of [11].
8.1 Mixed Economies
Example 1. My results in [11] dealt only with homogenous economies: the statement
of Theorem 1 in [11] does not mention whether mixed economies were included, but it
is clear to anyone who read my proofs that I covered only homogeneous economies, see
p. 103, Section 7.0.1., lines 1-5 of [11]. By contrast, the comment's example is not
a homogeneous economy, as shown below. Therefore, the comment's example is not a
counterexample to the results in the publications which it addresses, all of which pertain
the proofs in [11]. This is easy to check: [36] consists of one simple example of an
economy with short sales, two traders and two goods. Trader's one utility is U\{x\,X2) =
x\ +x2+2— y/(xi — x2)2 + 4, and trader two's utility is w2(^i, ^2) = ^ i - 3 2 This is a "mixed
economy," because trader one's indifferences are bounded below, while trader two's are
not, and trader one's indifferences have no half lines while trader two's indifferences have
half lines. As stated in Lemma 2 [11] Section 7.0.1, p. 103, lines 1-5, I considered the
two cases separately: homogeneous economies where either all traders have indifferences
bounded below, which is not really new, or the new case where all indifference surfaces
are unbounded below.33
Therefore the comment's example is irrelevant to the publications which it addresses.
It deals with a "mixed economy", a type of economy which was covered in my paper [16],
30See e.g. Lemma 2 of [11], p. 103, Section 7.0.1, lines 1-5.
When all traders have indifferences bounded below, or when none do.
32See [36] Section 3, Figures l(a, l(b), 2(a) and 2(b), and subsection 3.2.
I quote from [11], p. 103, Section 7.0.1., lines 1-5: "When all indifference surfaces of the preferences
are bounded below the proof is identical to the case where X = R^_ a case where the result is known
(cf. Arrow and Hahn [1]). Therefore we need only consider the case where X = RN and where the
indifference surfaces of the traders are not all bounded below", lines 1-5, p. 103, Section 7.0.1. of [11].
Observe that by Assumption 2 on page 84 of [11], or Assumption 2 above, if one indifference surface of a
trader is bounded below, then all of his/her indifference surfaces are bounded below. Therefore the two
exclusive cases considered in [11] are either: all indifference surfaces are bounded below, or none are. It
is clear that the example in Section 3 of the comment does not satisfy my conditions because it mixes
two types of preferences.
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which is cited in the comment as Chichilnisky (1995b). It is therefore of interest to point
out that the comment's example is consistent with the results on mixed economies of [16].
In addition to misunderstanding my hypothesis, the three authors made another erros.
They misread my definitions and erred in the definition of global cones and limited arbi-
trage, as shown below. This point was already made in [29]—see the quote below—and
is explained in what follows. Because their example does not satisfy limited arbitrage,
it does not have a competitive equilibrium. Thus their example confirms Theorem 2 for
mixed economies in [16], reported also in this paper, Theorem 2 above.
The details are as follows. On the last line of Section 3.1 of [36] the authors state
"Thus limited arbitrage is satisfied." However, the three authors made an error: this
economy does not have limited arbitrage. By the definition of Gh in (1) (see [16] and
also [11], p. 85 (4)), the first trader in the example of [36] Section 3 has as global cone
G\ = {xi,X2 : X\ > 0 and X2 > 0}, i.e. the closed positive orthant, because this trader's
indifferences contain no half lines (this is case (b) of [11], p. 85 (4)). However the three
authors got this wrong, stating that my global cone Gh is the set they denote A\ in the
statement of their Theorem 3 [36]. As already seen, however, my definition of global cones
given in [16] and in [11] p. 85, (4) states clearly that when preferences contain no half
lines (case (b)) the global cone Gh is the closure of the set Ah-, i.e. it is the set they
denote I\ in Theorem 3 of [36]. The three authors confused h with A\. This is an error
which invalidates the rest of the statements in the comment.
The second trader has half-lines in the indifferences (case (a)), and by definition of Gh
in (1), Gh is open, indeed it is the open half space defined by G<2 — \x\,X2 6 R2 : X\ > 0},
as the authors themselves point out in Theorem 3 of Section 3.2.
It is now immediate to observe that, contrary to what the comment states, limited
arbitrage is not satisfied in their example in Section 3, Theorem 3 of [36]. The market
cones are respectively the open positive orthant D\ = {(x\,X2) : X\ > 0 and x^ > 0}
and the vertical line £)2 — {{X\-,X2) = #i = 0}. Since D\ D D2 = 0, limited arbitrage is
not satisfied. This economy has no equilibrium, as the comment states. Since there is
no equilibrium and limited arbitrage fails, this example is consistent with my results in
Theorem 2 of [16], which are reported also in this paper. It appears that the authors have
misread my papers.
This point was clearly stated in a letter dated January 10, 1996 from Heller, Groves.
Hirsch, Shafer and others [29] addressed to Monteiro, Page and Wooders:
"You recently circulated two papers which claim to find counterexamples to
recently published papers by Graciela Chichilnisky. Her papers [11], [8] and
[14] contain two very important and original results on arbitrage, the Pareto
frontier and equilibrium....Of the three papers on which you comment, this [11]
contains the most recent and complete statements...However, you have mis-
read a definition, a proposition and a lemma. You have also omitted some of
Chichilnisky's assumptions in obtaining your "counterexample."....The exam-
ple in Monteiro Page and Wooders' second paper is built on "mixed economies"
where different agents have different types of preferences (bounded or un-
bounded below, half lines and no half lines). Monteiro, Page and Wooders
take agent 1 to fall in case (a) whereas a natural interpretation is that agent
1 falls in the explicit "no-half lines" case (b). Thus agent l's global cone is
closed, limited arbitrage fails and there is no inconsistency with Chichilnisky's
results."
A subsequent letter [30] from W. Heller and M. Hirsch addressed to F. Page and M.
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Wooders dated February 29, 1996, states:
"It is misleading to say that you have counterexamples to theorems in Chichilnisky's
papers in BAMS and AER. The theorems in question were only announced
there, not proved. If you want to say that the theorems were stated too tersely,
that is one thing. To say that they are wrong is quite another and we do not
agree with you on that point"
Both letters [29] and [30] are available from the author upon request.
8.2 Markets without short sales
Example 2. The comment [36] refers briefly to my results on the classic Arrow Debreu
economy without short sales in its Section 5, last paragraph. The three authors claim that
my example in Figure 4B of [11], p. 88, has a competitive equilibrium but does not satisfy
limited arbitrage. This is incorrect, because this example does not have a competitive
equilibrium. This is in accordance with Theorem 1 of [11] and Theorem 2 above and in
[16]. Their example thus confirms my results.
Figure 4B in [11] is a two person economy with trading space X — R2^. Trader one
owns Qi = (0,2:2), a vector consisting only of second good34 and trader two owns a vector
0.2 which is in the interior of the positive orthant.35 Trader one has a preference which
is strictly increasing in both goods.36 For trader one the global cone is Gi(Oi) = R2^ =
{(xi,X2) : X\ > 0 and X2 > 0} i.e. the whole positive orthant37 R\ and by definition
Di = {(x1,rr2) : X\ > 0 and X2 > 0}. Trader two is indifferent in the second good as
shown in Figure 4B of [11]. Furthermore since this trader has an interior endowment38 O2
the only price in the set39 S(E) is the vector v = (1,0) as indicated in Figure 4B.40 Since
(v, fix) = 0, by definition S(E) C N. Therefore by definition Df = Di D S{E) = 0.41 It
follows that limited arbitrage is not satisfied in Figure 4B, because D^ = 0 => D^ DD^ =
0. By Theorem 2 above (see also Theorem 2 of [16]) this economy has no competitive
equilibrium. This is easy to verify. The only possible supporting price is v, at which
excess demand of trader one is not well defined. The comment went wrong by stating
that in my example "one trader likes only one good and is endowed with the other good"
see last paragraph of Section 5 of [36]. Neither of my two traders has the characteristic
described by the comment: trader one only owns the second good and prefers both, and
trader two owns both goods and prefers only the first. As detailed above, this example
fails to have limited arbitrage since D* D D^ = 0- Since there is no equilibrium and
limited arbitrage fails, this example confirms my Theorem 2 above [16], and Theorem 1
of [11].
8.2.1 Limited arbitrage is strictly weaker than resource relatedness
Example 3. This example is Figure 4A in [11], p. 89. It shows that limited arbitrage is
strictly weaker than resource relatedness—even though it is still sufficient for the existence
34See [11] page 89, lines 3 and 10-11.
35See lines 1-2 and 10-11, p. 89 of [11].
36There is an obvious switch in the indices 1 and 2 here but in any case the argument is clear.
37As stated in lines 12-15 p. 89 of [11].
38As stated in lines 1-2 and 10-11 p. 89 of [11].
39As mentioned above in ft. , the definition of S(E) missed the expression u(v,x^ — (7^) = 0" in [11],
but this appeared correctly in the revised version of [16] which the three authors of [36] have.
40And as stated in lines 13-15 p. 89 of [11].
41
 As stated in page 89, line 13 and in my Figure 4B of [11].
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of an Arrow Debreu equilibrium. Figure 4A depicts a two-trader two-good economy
without short sales, where one trader only owns good two, Q\ = (0, X\) and the other
owns both n2 = (2/1,2/2), V\ > 0 and j/2 > 0. Both traders are indifferent about good two,
having the same utility function u(z, w) = z. This example has a competitive equilibrium:
it is the initial endowment with prices (1,0); the economy also satisfies limited arbitrage as
Theorem 1 of [11] predicts. However, this economy does not satisfy resource relatedness,
because trader one's endowment has no value for trader two. This shows that limited
arbitrage is strictly weaker than resource relatedness. The details are as follows. As
shown above, the only vector in S(E) is v = (1,0), because Q2 >> 0 and u(z,w) — z.
Furthermore <u,fti) = 0, so that S(E) C N. Here Gi(fti) = G2(ft2) = {(^1,^2) : xx > 0
and X2 > 0} and D\ = D<i = {(^1,^2) : x\ > 0 and X2 > 0}, so that Di± — D~^ =
£>i D S(E) = {v} ^  0, and £>+ n D% = {v} ^  0. Therefore limited arbitrage is satisfied
and, as proved in Theorem 1 of [11] and Theorem 2 above [16], a competitive equilibrium
exists. Yet resource relatedness is not satisfied.
Example 4. The final example refers to Figure 7 in page 92 of [11]. This figure is the
same as Figure 4B above, and as stated in its legend, it has no competitive equilibrium.
The comment [36] states that "limited arbitrage is satisfied in this case (Figure 7)", see
last paragraph of [36]. However, as was shown in Example 2 above, the comment is wrong:
Figure 7 in page 92 does not satisfy limited arbitrage. This is an example where there
is no competitive equilibrium and limited arbitrage fails, and which is consistent with
Theorem 1 in [11] and Theorem 2 above [16].
9 Other Issues in [36]
A number of other statements in [36] could confuse the reader.
1. [36] claims that "Chichilnisky's notion of gains from trade has no relevance for the
existence of an equilibrium."42 However, as shown in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 above,
and previously in [16], in Proposition 2 page 90 of [11] and mentioned in Proposition 1
of [14], p. 428, gains from trade are closely related to limited arbitrage, and therefore
from Theorem 1 of [11] and Theorem 2 above and [16], to the existence of a competitive
equilibrium. Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for attainable and bounded
gains from trade.43 The connection between limited arbitrage and bounded gains from
trade is indeed very close.
2. [36] states44 that "One of the main objectives of Chichilnisky [14] and [8] appears
to have been to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium in
terms of conditions limiting arbitrage for economic models in which agent's indifference
surfaces are allowed to contain half lines". This statement contains two errors. The main
purpose of my papers [14] and [8] was not to prove a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of an equilibrium: [8] contains only results in algebraic topology and [14]
contains only results in social choice.45 Of the three papers, the only one to contain details
and proofs on equilibrium and limited arbitrage is [11], in Theorem 1 p. 94. Theorem 1
of [11] is correct exactly as stated and proved.
A second error in the statement quoted above is to imply that I focus on the case of
42
 See [36], page 1, first paragraph.
See Proposition 2 above; in case (a) of [11] limited arbitrage is also necessary and sufficient for
bounded gains from trade as stated in [14], and in Corollary 1 above.
44In para. 5 of its Introduction.
45Both of these papers refer the reader to [11] for details and proofs on equilibrium, see [14] p. 430,
line 19, and [8] p. 195, lines 8-9.
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indifferences with half lines (a). This is incorrect: although case (b) is very simple I cover
this case as well.46 Indeed my work on no-arbitrage and equilibrium in preferences with-
out half lines goes back to 1984 [18] and [22]: results on no-arbitrage, the compactness
of the Pareto frontier and the existence of a competitive equilibrium for preferences with-
out half lines are in Chichilnisky and Heal [18] and in [22], Lemmas 4 and 5 and Theorem
1.
3. In Section 5, under the title "Impact of Changes in Chichilnisky [11]", the comment
states: "Below we argue that global cones in Chichilnisky [11] are not well defined".
It is easy to check that my global cones are well defined. In p. 84, Assumption 2, lines
3-5 of [11] I define two cases: "\/h : (a) the directions of the gradients of each indifference
surface which is not bounded below define a closed set, or (b) indifferences contain no half
lines". It is clear that whenever preferences have indifferences without half lines, we are
in case (b). In [11], p. 84 (4) I define the global cone as follows: in case (a), the global
cone is Ah(Qh) and in case (b), its closure Ah(£lh)-
The comment [36] mentions that cases (a) and (b) in Assumption 2 of [11] may
overlap.47 This is irrelevant. The only possible overlap is when indifferences are bounded
below and contain no half lines, but when preferences are all in this case any definition
of the global cone (Ah or Ah) works, because all my conditions and results hold true
trivially. In this case limited arbitrage is always trivially satisfied (with either cone Ah.
or Ah), an equilibrium always exists, and the Pareto frontier is always compact because
indifferences are bounded below.
10 Conclusions
The comment [36] contains several misunderstandings and errors.
• The example in the comment is a "mixed economy", while none of my three pub-
lications which the comment addresses—[8], [14] or [11]—claim to cover mixed
economies. The comment is therefore irrelevant to the publications on which it
comments.
• The publications on which the comment concentrates [8] and [14] contain brief an-
nouncements without details, and contain no proofs,
• Proofs of my results on equilibrium were published in [11]. These proofs are correct
exactly as given and do not cover mixed economies. There is no inconsistency
between the comment's example and any of my results, because they start from
different conditions,
• Rather than being a counterexample, the example given in the comment [36] is a
special case of my results for mixed economies of [16] reported above, results which
the three authors acknowledge they have. Yet they failed to inform the reader of
this consistency.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 of [11] cover preferences with half lines in their indifferences as well as
those without, see p. 84 of [11], Assumption 2, lines 3-4, where case (a) is with half lines and case (b)
without half lines. See also the definition of global cones for cases (a) and (b) in p. 85, section 2.2 of [11];
Lemma 2 p. 96 and 103 of [11] on the compactness of the Pareto frontier covers also cases (a) and (b),
as does Theorem 1 on limited arbitrage being necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, p. 94 of [11].
47In paragraph 1 of the subsection on "impacts", Section 5.
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Furthermore in [11] I established:
• Global cones Gh in [11] are well defined, and using these cones limited arbitrage
bounds trades and utility exactly as needed for the existence of a competitive equi-
librium,
• Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for bounded and attainable gains from
trade [11],
• Limited arbitrage is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium and for the compactness of the Pareto frontier, and
• All the above results hold in economies with or without short sales, and whether
traders' indifferences contain half lines or not.
The present paper:
• Extends all the above results to mixed economies which treat all preferences in a
unified way, following [16],
• Defines social diversity and a topological invariant which contains exact informa-
tion about the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the economy and its sube-
conomies,
• Shows that when limited arbitrage fails every quasiequilibrium has a failure of 'ef-
fective' demand.
11 Appendix
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2: (i) The cone Gh(Vth) equals Ah{Qh) when indiffer-
ences contain half lines (case (a)) and its closure when they do not, (case (b)), and thus
it is identical to the global cone defined in [11], (ii) the cones Ah(nh) = Gh(Clh) and are
independent of initial endowments Clh £ RN (Hi) When preferences are in cases (a) and
(b) the global cones Gh(Qh) Q>re independent of initial endowments, but they are not nec-
essarily independent in general, and (iv) None of these results need hold when Assumption
2 is not satisfied.
Proof. See also [16].
Define the sets:
Bh(nh) = {xGX : uh(nh + Xx) > uh(Qh + rjx) when A > 77 > 0,
lim Uh(Qh + Xjx) = u° < 00 and 3j : Uh(Qh + XJX) = u°},
\j—>OO
and
C/i(^/i) = {x E X : Uh{Vth + Ax) > Uh(£lh + Tjx) when X > r\ > 0,
lim Uh{Vth + XJX) = u° < 00 and ~ 3j : Uh(Vlh 4- XJX) — u°).
\j—>00
The three sets A^(Q,^), 5^(0^) and 0^(0,^) are disjoint pairwise and
Ah{nh) u Bh(nh) u ch{nh) u Hh{nh) = RN. (7)
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where Hh{Qh) is the complement of A^(fi/l)UB/l(^/l)UC/l(D/l). Observe that by convexity
of preferences Hh{£lh) is the set of directions along which the utility achieves a maximum
value and decreases thereafter.
The first step is to observe that if z e Bh(Vth) U Ch(Qh), then for all s G RN
s » z => s £ Ah(nh) (8)
and
s«z=>s£Hh(nh). (9)
This follows from monotonicity and Assumption 2, which implies that the rate of increase
of the utility is uniformly bounded below above zero along the direction defined by any
strictly positive vector. Since the utility Uh is non-satiated (8) and (9) together imply
that for every e > 0, E3A > 0 s.t. an £ neighborhood of a vector \z £ Bh(flh) U Ch{Q.h)
contains a vector s in the set Ah{Slh) and another vector v in the set Hh(^h)- This implies
that the set Bh(Qh.) UC/l(fi/l) is in the boundary of the set Ah(Qh)- The relation between
C/l(r2/l) and Ah(Qh) stated in (i) is now immediate, cf. [11], p. 85, (4).
The next step is to show that if two different half-lines / = {f2ft + Xv}\>o and m =
{Aft 4- Xv}A>O a r e parallel translates of each other, and / C Aft(f2ft), then m C A/^A/J, V
Aft € m. This is immediate from Assumption 2, which ensures that the rate of increase
of the utility is uniformly bounded above. Therefore the cone Ah is independent of the
initial endowments.
Observe that for a general convex preference represented by a utility Uh the set Gh.{Vth)
itself may vary as the vector Q,h varies, since the set Bh{£lh) itself may vary with fift: at
some r^ ft a direction z £ dG^ may be in B^^h) and at others 5ft(Oft) may be empty
and z € Cft(ilft) instead. This occurs when along a ray defined by a vector z from one
endowment the utility levels asymptote to a finite limit but do not reach their limiting
value, while at other endowments, along the same direction z, they achieve this limit. This
cannot happen when the preferences are in cases (a) or (b), but is otherwise consistent
with Assumption 2. This example, and similar reasonings for A^i^lh) completes the proof
of the proposition. I
Proof of Theorem 1 (Limited arbitrage is equivalent to the compactness of
J7(E)):
This result always holds when the consumption set is bounded below by some vector
in the space, and in that case it is proved using standard arguments, see e.g. Arrow and
Hahn [1]. Therefore in the following I concentrate in the case where X is unbounded
below.
Sufficiency first. Assume E has limited arbitrage. Since global cones are independent
of initial endowments by Proposition 3, we may assume without loss of generality that
Qh = 0 for all h. If U(E) was not bounded there would exist a sequence of individually
rational net trades [zJl...z3H)j=12.,. and therefore correspondingly positive utility levels,
such that: ^j,Ylhzh ~ ^' an<^ f°r s o m e >^ limj^oo Uh{z3h) = oo. Therefore for some h,
limj\\zJh\\ = oo, and there exists a subsequence of its normalized vectors, denoted also
by {Zft/H f^tH}, which is convergent. I will now prove that Zft = lirrij 2^/ | |^ | | £ C/i, the
closure of Gft. The proof is by contradiction. If z^ £ G^ then by quasiconcavity of u^
and by the proof of Proposition 3, along the ray defined by z^ the utility Uh achieves a
maximum level u° at Xoz, for Ao > 0, and decreases thereafter: A > Ao => Uh{Xzh) < u°.
Define a function 6 : R+ —>• R+ by Uh{Xzh + O(X)e) — u°, where e = (1,..., 1). I will show
that 6 is a convex function. By convexity of preferences,
u° < uh(a(Xzh + O(X)e) + (1 - a)(Xzh + 6>(A)e)) (10)
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= uh((a\ + (1 - a)\)zh 4- (a6(\) + (1 - a)(0(A))e). (11)
Thus by monotonicity, 0(aX + (1 - a)A) < a0(\) + (1 - a)6>(A).
Assumption 2 together with monotonicity implies that the rate of increase of Uh along
the direction defined by e (or by any strictly positive vector) is uniformly bounded below:
3e > 0 : | uh{x + 0e) - uh(x) \>\ 9 \ e, V6> G R+,Wx G RN. Therefore uh(Xzh + 9{X)e) =
u° > uh{Xzh) + 0(X)s, so that uh(Xzh) < u° - 9{X)e. Note that 0(AO) = 0 and 0(A) > 0
for A > Ao. Since 9 is convex, Hmx^oo9(X) = oo, and Uh(Xzh) < u° — 0(X)e implies
Uh{Xzh) —• —oo. It follows that Zh £ Gh for otherwise, since limj \\ z3h ||= oo and the
vectors zJh wander arbitrarily close to the direction defined by Zh, Hraj^00Uh{z3h) < 0
contradicting individually rationality of the allocations {z\...z3H)J=\^...- Now recall that
J
g) = oo. By Assumption 2, | ug(x) — ug(y) |< K\\x — y\\ Vx,y G RN, so foru g(zJg
\any n and j  ug(z™) — ug(z^ — je) |< X||je| | , so for every j there exists an rtj such that
g
l:>
 — je) > j . Take the sequence {z^1} and relabel it {z3g}. Now consider the newUg(z  — je) > j . Take the sequence {z^} and relabel it {z3g
sequence of allocations {z\ 4 - ^ r j , •--, zJg — je, •••,z3H + jf^j} and call it also {z3h\h=i,2,...,H]
this defines a feasible allocation for all j and by Assumption 2, V/i, K/,,(z^) —>• oo. In
particular ||2^|| —» oo. Define now C as the set of all strictly positive convex combinations
of the vectors Zh for all h. Then either C is strictly contained in a half space, or it defines
a subspace of RN. Since ^2h z3h = 0, C cannot be strictly contained in a half space.
Therefore, C defines a subspace; in particular for any g, 3Xh > 0 V h such that (*)
— zg = ^2hXhZh- When one trader g has indifferences without half lines Gg = Gg and
zg G Gg => zg G Gg, which by (*) contradicts limited arbitrage because ~ zip : (p, Zh) > 0
for Zh G Gh all h, and (p, zg) > 0 zg G Gg. When for all h the normalized gradients to any
closed set of indifferent vectors defines a closed set, the global cone Gh is open [11] so that
its complement Gch is closed, and the set of directions in Gch is compact. On each direction
of Gh the utility Uh achieves a maximum; therefore there exists for each h a maximum
utility level for Uh over all directions in Gch. Since along the sequence {z3h} every trader's
utility increases without bound, V h 3 jh'-j > jh => zJh G Gh- However Y^h zh ~ ^' a S a i n
contradicting limited arbitrage. In all cases a contradiction arises from assuming that
U(E) is not bounded, so U(E) must be bounded.
The next step is to prove that U(E) is closed when limited arbitrage is satisfied.
z i ®Consider a sequence of allocations {^,}j=i,2... > h= 1,2,...,//, satisfying Vj, ^2h=i zii
Assume that Vj, Ui(zl), ...,UH(Z3H) C R*l and converges as j —* oo to a utility allocation
v = (VI,...,VJJ) G R+, which is undominated by any other feasible utility allocation.
Observe that the vector v may or may not be the utility vector of a feasible allocation:
when limited arbitrage is satisfied, I will prove that it is. The result is immediate if the
sequence of allocations {^}j=i,2..., h = 1,2, . . . , i / is bounded; therefore I concentrate in
the case where the set of feasible allocations is not bounded. Let M be the set of all traders
h G {1,2., , , H}, which may be empty, for whom the corresponding sequence of allocations
{zJh}j=-l2... is bounded, i.e. / i £ M » 3Kh '• Vj, ||2^|| < Kh < oo; let J be its complement,
J — {1,2,. . . , / /} — M, which I assume to be non empty. There exists a subsequence
of the original sequence of allocations, which for simplicity is denoted also {^}j=i,2...,
h = l ,2 , . . . , i / , along which V/i G M, Iimj{2^}j-i2... = Zh exists, and by construction
IC/IGM Zh +limj_+oo X!/IGJ zh ~ 0- Consider now the sequence z^/||z^|| for h G J; it has
a convergent subsequence, denoted also ^ / | | ^ | | . Define Zh = limj ;r^/||z^||,ft. G J. Then
as seen in the first part of this proof, V7i G J, Zh G G/^O), because || z3h |—> oo and
uh(zh) — 0- If ^ ^ J, zh £ Gh(0) then the utility values of the traders attain their limit
for all h and the utility vector v is achieved by a feasible allocation. Therefore the proof
21
is complete. It only remains to consider the case where for some trader g E J, zg £ Gg(0).
As above, let C be the convex cone of all strictly positive linear combinations of the
vectors {zh}h£j- Then either C is contained strictly in a half-space of RN, or C spans a
subspace of RN. Since YlhzM Zh + lim.?->oo IC/IGJ z°h = ^ C cannot be strictly contained in
a half space, for otherwise Hindoo YlhzJ zh w o u ld n o t be bounded as V/i £ J, \\zJh\\ —> oo.
Therefore there exists a subspace 5" C RN spanned by {zh}heJ- In particular, — zg E S,
i.e. Vfo £ J, 3A/! > 0 such that (*)—% = ZlheJ ^h2^- Since in this last case V/i E J,
z/i ^ Gh(0) and for /i = g,zg £ C9(0), by limited arbitrage 3p G H^D^ s. t. (p,zg) > 0,
and Vh,{p,Zh) > 0, which contradicts (*). Since the contradiction arises from assuming
that the set U(E) is not closed, U(E) must be closed. Thus U(E) is compact. In particular,
since -P(E) is the boundary of U(E), limited arbitrage implies a compact Pareto frontier
P(E).
Necessity is established next. If limited arbitrage fails, there is no vector y G RN
such that (y,Zh) > 0 for all {zh) £ Gh(0). Equivalently, there exist a set J consisting
of at least two traders and, for each h G J, a vector Zh G Gh{0) such that X^heJ Zh = ^
Then either for some h, z^ G Ah so that the Pareto frontier is unbounded and therefore
not compact, or else for some h, z^ G ^ ^^(0) n Gh(0) and therefore the Pareto frontier
is not closed, and therefore U(E) is not compact. In either case, the Pareto frontier is
not compact when limited arbitrage fails. Therefore compactness of U(E) is necessary for
limited arbitrage. •
Proof of Theorem 2 (Limited arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a
competitive equilibrium):
Necessity first. Consider first the case X = RN and assume without loss of generality
that Q,h = 0 for all h. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that limited arbitrage fails
and let p* be an equilibrium price and x* = (x\,...x*H) the corresponding equilibrium
allocation. A failure of limited arbitrage means that 3 (zi, ...,ZH) : V h, z^ G G^(0),
and Y2h=i Zh ~ 0- By construction u^Azh) never ceases to increase with A, because
zh £ C/i((3)- Since global cones are uniform x*h 4- Zh £ Gh{x*h), so that by the same
reasoning x* cannot be Pareto efficient, contradicting the fact that x* is a competitive
equilibrium
Consider next X = R%. Assume that V? G 5(E) 3 h G {1, ...,H} such that (q, Qh) - 0.
Then if limited arbitrage is not satisfied H/Li ^ ti^h) = 0? which implies that Vp G S(E),
3handv(p)G Gh(nh):
(p,Xv{p)) <0, VA>0 (12)
This implies that a competitive equilibrium price cannot exist. By contradiction. Let
p* be an equilibrium price and x* G XH be the corresponding equilibrium allocation.
Then p* £ S(E), so that by (12) x*h + Xv(p) is affordable and strictly preferred to x* for
some A > 0, contradicting the assumption that x* is an equilibrium allocation. Therefore
limited arbitrage is also necessary for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this
case.
It remains to consider the case where 3p £ S(E) such that VTJ, £ {!,...,//}, (p, Qh) 7^ 0-
But in this case by definition f|f=i D^(flh) # 0 since V/i £ {1...H}, R%+ C D+(flh), so
that limited arbitrage is always satisfied when an equilibrium exists. This completes the
proof of necessity when X — R+ .
Sufficiency next. The proof uses the fact that the Pareto frontier is homeomorphic to a
simplex. When X — R^_ the Pareto frontier of the economy P(E) is always homeomorphic
to a simplex, see Arrow and Hahn [1]. In the case X = RN this may fail: for example
U(E) may be unbounded. However, by Theorem 1 above, if the economy satisfies limited
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arbitrage then the utility possibility set U(E)C R+ and the Pareto frontier P(E) C R+
are compact; under the assumptions on preferences, -P(E) is then also homeomorphic
to a simplex [1]. Therefore in both cases, P(E) is homeomorphic to a simplex and I
can apply a method due to Chichilnisky and Heal [18] which extends Negishi's method
of using a fixed point argument on the Pareto frontier48 to establish the existence of a
pseudoequilibrium with or without short sales.49 It remains however to prove that the
pseudoequilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium.
To complete the proof of existence of a competitive equilibrium consider first X =
RN. Then V/i = 1, ...,H there exists an allocation in X of strictly lower value than the
pseudoequilibrium x*h at the price p*. Therefore by Lemma 3, Chapter 4, page 81 of Arrow
and Hahn [1], the quasi-equilibrium (p*,x*) is also a competitive equilibrium, completing
the proof of existence when X = RN.
Next consider X = R+, and a quasi-equilibrium (p*,x*) whose existence was already
established. If every individual has a positive income at p*, i.e. \/h, (p*,Qh) > 0, then
by Lemma 3, Chapter 4 of Arrow and Hahn [1] the quasi-equilibrium (p*,x*) is also a
competitive equilibrium, completing the proof. Furthermore, observe that in any case
the pseudoequilibrium price p* G S(E), so that S(E) is not empty. To prove existence
we consider therefore two cases: first the case where 3q* £ S(E) : V/i, {q*,Qh) > 0.
In this case, by the above remarks from Arrow and Hahn [1], (q*,x*) is a competitive
equilibrium. The second case is when \/q G S(E),3h G {1,...,//"} such that (q,Qh) = 0.
Limited arbitrage then implies:
3q* G S{E) : V/i, (q*,v) > 0 for all v G Gh(Cth). (13)
Let x* = x j , . . . , x*H G XH be a feasible allocation in T supported by the vector q* defined
in (13): by definition, V/i, Uh(x*h) > Uk(Qh) and q* supports x*. Note that any h minimizes
costs at x*h because q* is a support. Furthermore x*h is affordable under q*. Therefore,
(q*,x*) can fail to be a competitive equilibrium only when for some h, (q*,x*h) = 0, for
otherwise the cost minimizing allocation is always also utility maximizing in the budget
set Bh(q*) = {w£X: (q*,w) = (q\nh)}.
It remains therefore to prove existence when (q*,x*h) = 0 for some h. Since by the
definition of S(E), x* is individually rational, i.e. V/i, Uh{x*h) > w/l(J7/l), then (q*,x*h) = 0
implies (g*,0^) = 0, because by definition q* is a supporting price for the equilibrium
allocation x*. If V/i, Uh(x*h) — 0 then x£ G dR+, and by the monotonicity and quasi-
concavity of Uh, any vector y in the budget set defined by the price p*,Bh(q*), must also
satisfy Uh{y) = 0, so that x*h maximizes utility in Bh(q*), which implies that (g*,x*) is a
competitive equilibrium. Therefore (g*,x*) is a competitive equilibrium unless for some
h, uh{x\) > 0.
Assume therefore that the quasiequilibrium (q*,x*) is not a competitive equilibrium,
and that for some h with (q*,Qh) = 0,uh(x*h) > 0. Since uh(x*h) > 0 and x*h G dR+ then
an indifference surface of a commodity bundle of positive utility ^^(x^) intersects dR+
at x*h G dR+. Let r be the ray in dR±containing x*h. If w G r then (q*,w) = 0, because
(q* ,x*h) = 0. Since ^^(x^) > 0, by Assumption 1 Uh does not reach a maximum along r,
so that w G Gk(x*h). But this contradicts the choice of q* as a supporting price satisfying
48Negishi's method for proving the existence of a pseudoequilibrium [37] applies only to the case where
the economy has no short sales. This result was extended by Chichilnisky and Heal [18] and [22] to
economies with short sales, where feasible desirable allocations may be unbounded, see also [20] and
Chichilnisky [11].
49A pseudoequilibrium, also called quasiequilibrium, is an allocation and a price at which traders
minimize cost and markets clear.
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limited arbitrage (13) since
3h and w <E Gh(Qh) such that (q* ,w) = 0. (14)
The contradiction between (14) and (13) arose from the assumption that (q*,x*) is not
a competitive equilibrium, so that (q*,x*) must be a competitive equilibrium, and the
proof is complete. •
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